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ASSMENT 
The following three contributions are transcripts of papers delivered at the 
recent Institute of Industrial Relations Research seminar Personal 
Grievances: the ,expanded jurisdiction held at Wellington on Oct~ober 2~6 
1988 
The sexual harassment provisions of the 
Labour R~elations Act 
Richard P. Boast* 
Tbe statutory provisions: an overview 
Sexual harassment is not wholly self-contained, in that it can be relevant to other 
types of personal grievance. There is no reason why sexual harassment could not, for 
instance, amount to constructive dismissal. In this paper I will focus on the specific 
sexual harassment pfovisions of the 1987 Act 
The applicable provisions afe sections 210, 212, 221, 222 and 227. Significantly, 
these provisions fall within Part IX of the Ac~ which deals with personal grievances. The 
sexual harassment provisions have been grafted on to the well-established personal 
grievance procedures and thus obviously must share all of the advantages - and limitations-
of the personal grievance system. 
Section 210 explicitly includes within the definition of "pe[S()nal grievance,.: 
... (d) That dte worker has been sexually harassed in the worker's employment. 
Section 211 attempts to define the concept of "sexual harassment." I will return to 
these definitional aspects later. The section is concerned essentially with sexual 
harassment by the employer, or the ~employer's "representative" (an employer's 
representative is defined in section 210(2) to mean an employee who either "has authority 
over the worker alleging the grievance" or, alternatively. "is in a position of authority 
over other workers in the workplace of the worker alleging the grievance"'). Section 222 
deals with sexual harassment of a worker by persons other than an employer or an 
employer's representative. such as, for instance., the employer's customers or clients, or by 
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other workers not in a position of authority over the complainant. In such a situation the 
affected worker can make a complaint in writing (section 222(1)); the employer is obliged 
to "inquire into the facts"' and, "if satisfied" that the complaint has been made out, shall 
take "whatever steps are practicable to prevent any repetition of such a request or of such 
behaviour". 
Sexual harassment by co-workers or customers only constitutes a personal grievance, 
however, if there is a fepetition of the behaviour after the complaint and the employer "has 
not taken whatever steps afe prncticable to prevent the repetition of such a request or such 
behaviour" (section 222(3)). The Act, in other words, draws a ~clear distinction between 
sexual harassment by the employer, or the employer's representative (a personal grievance 
in its own right) and sexual harassment by other persons. This distinction is fully in 
accordance with the statutory definition of sexual harassment, as will be seen. Whether 
the distinction is sensible, or appropriate, is of course another .matter. It might be argued 
that sexual harassment by co-workers is every bit as much of a menace as by employers or 
fioremen, and in the fornaer category it might seem unreasonable for the employee to have 
to wait for a repetition of the behaviour and for the employer's failure to act before he or 
she has a valid personal grievance. 
Section 221 sets up some special statutory procedures to apply where sexual 
harassment has been alleged. I will consider this provision in detail a li ttie later. Section 
227 lists the various remedies that a grievance ~committee or the Labour Court can grant if 
a personal grievance has been made out. These include reinstatement, ~eimbursement of 
wages, and compensation. These can all be relevant to a case of sexual harassment, of 
course, but the Act also lists some additional remedies in section 227(e), which stipulates.: 
If a grievance committee or the Labour Court finds a worker to have been 
sexually harassed in that worker's employment [the committee or the Labour 
Court may make] recommendations to the employer concerning the action the 
employer should take in respect of the person who made the request or was 
guilty of the behaviour, which action may include the transfer of that person, 
the taking of disciplinary action against that person, or the taking of 
rehabilitative action in respect of that person. 
The power is only, it should be noted, one of making recommendations. 
The definition or sexual harassment 
Sexual harassment, according to section 212, exists where the employer or his 
representative: 
(a) Makes a request of that worker for sexual intercourse, sexual contact, or 
other form of sexual activity, which contains -
(i) An implied or overt promise of preferential treatment in that worker's 
employment; or 
(ii) An implied or overt threat of detrimental treatment in that worker's 
employment; or 
(iii) An implied or overt threat about the pr,esent or future employment 
status of that worker; or 
(b) By -
(i) The use of words (whether written or spoken) of a sexual nature; or 
(ii) Physical behaviour of a sexual nature, -
subjects that worker to behaviour which is unwelcome or offensive to that 
worker (whether or not that is ,conveyed to the employer or representativ,e) 
and which is either repeated or of such a significant nature that it has a 
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detrimental effect. on that worker's employment, job performance, or job 
satisfaction. 
Clearly two rather different 'kinds of behaviour are proscribed here. "Type A" sexual 
harassment is where sexual contact is requested of a worker coupled with a threat - that is, 
unless the request is gnmtcd, ~certain ~employment-relat~ed ~consequences can follow. In 
other words, it is a misuse of the pow~er imbalance in a contract of employment to obtain 
sexual gratification of some kind. A useful label is "sexual exploitation". "Type B"' is 
the situation of unwelcome sexual attention .. fondlings and pattings or comments for 
instance, which I will label as "sexual nuisance" harassment Again we see a distinction 
drawn between different categories, and a ranking of them. "Sexual exploitation" is 
obviously regarded as a more serious matter than "sexual nuisance" harassmenl That is 
because in the latter category the behaviour must either be r.epe,ated or have a "detrimental 
effect" on the worker's employment, job perfouuance or job satisfaction, before the 
behaviour amounts to "sexual harassmentu. 
Whether this ~categorisation is appropriate and whether our legislators have ,got their 
priorities right is of course open to ,argument. 
Does the harassment have to take place at work? 
The answer is no. Section 212 does not require that the threats or nuisance behaviour 
occur at work; nor does section 222, although with section 222 it might be argued that a 
fequirement ·that the behaviour take place at work is imp.lied (why require the employer to 
take action'?). With section 212, however, there is clearly no justification for limiting the 
scope of the provisions to incidents which occur at work. A sexual demand coupled with 
a threat could just as easily be made after office hours, over the telephone for ~example. It 
is the employer-employee nexus which is significant, not the locality. 'Thus if the 
requirements of section 212 are met then the worker is deemed to have been "sexually 
harassed in that worker's employment'', and a personal grievance e ists. 
R~eJa ·tionship with personal grievance procedures 
agreem ~ents 
• 10 awards and 
The sexual harassment provisions of the Act have so far surfaced in the Labour Court 
only once, in Northern Industrial District Distribution Workers and 1-lawke's Ba.y P~ovince 
Stores. Packing and Warehouse Workers IUW v AB Ltd., unreported, Labour Court, 1 
August 1988, (ALC 77/88, 503/87), Finnigan J. One of the issues which arose was the 
felationship between the statutory procedures relating to sexual harassment and the 
personal grievance procedures set out in an awaro or agreement 
The procedures set out in section 221 are obviously intended to supplement, not 
replace, personal grievance procedures set out in an award. Section 221(d) stipulates, in 
effect, that ·the usual procedures will continue to apply. The most significant requirement 
is section 22l(c), which forbids - reasonably enough - the grievance com·mittee from 
taking into account evidence of the worker's "sexual experience or reputation". 
In the AB Ltd case 'the union, after determining to proceed on the worker's behalf, 
wrote to the employer liequesting the manager to attend a Personal Grievance hearing 
constituted under section 221. This request was complied with, but lhere was ~considerable 
uncertainty as to whether the procedure which had been used ·was correct, uncertainty 
which was, as the event proved, well-founded: the Labour Court held thar the grievance 
proceedings adopted were "infonnal". Fortunately for the union's case, however, the Court 
used section 315 of the Act, which allows ~or the validation of infotanal proceedings, to 
validate the procedure which had been employed. 
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The Court sum.marised the felationship betw~een the statutory definitions and 
procedures and award/agreement procedures as follows: 
... At the hearing the union relied upon the definition of "personal grievance" 
in section 210 of the Act which includes a worker's claim of sexual 
harassment, and upon the definition of '"sexual harassment" in section 212. 
It is submitted that these definitions have been effective since the date the 
current Act came into force. We accept that submission. It is then submitted 
that these defmitions are incorporated into the personal grievance procedures 
of the New Zealand Retail (Non-Food) Employees' Award dated 3 March 1987 
(the award). This in our view is also sound. Pursuant to sections 364(1 ), 160 
and 171 of the Ac~ the proper procedures are those contained in the award. 
That is a situation of law created by the Act. The Act therefore excludes ·the 
procedur·e which the union adopted. We conclude that while the award remains 
in force, the proper procedures for personal grievances, among which are now 
included sexual harassment as defined in section 212, is the award procedure. 
We so hold. 
Matt·ers of evidence and proof 
The Labour Court in the AB Ltd case (supra) also dealt with some important matters 
of evidence and proof. The Court concluded that the burden of proof falls on the union (or 
the individual worker, in those restricted situations where an individual ~can bring 
proceedings). The standard of proof, somewhat oddly, was equated with that notuaally 
applicable in contested paternity cases. This standard was in tum defined in Hall v Vai I 
[1972] NZLR 95 as a standard of the balance of probabilities "'giving due ·weight to the 
gravity of the applicant's allegation of paternity". Why the test for paternity cases, of all 
things, was thought of as appropriate in this context is hard to understand. In view of the 
Labour Court's subsequent discussion of the Court of Appeal's judgement in Tv M 
[1984] 1 FRNZ 326 (where Woodhouse J made it very clear that in his view the "'gravity 
of the allegation" component was implicit in the test of the balance of probabilities in any 
event) it might have been better for the Labour Court, with respect, to have said that the 
appropriate standafd was the ordinary civil standard and to have left it at that 
'The Labour Court also determined that "similar fact" evidence, not peunitted in 
criminal cases., is admissible in the Labour Court. In other words, a complainant can 
support the allegation of sexual harassment by giving evidence of similar behaviour on 
the part of the harasser on other occasions, or indeed, other persons can give such 
evidence. The Labour Court noted its flexible powers to receive evidence under the "equity 
and good conscience" provisions, especially section 303(1) which gives to the Court 
power to "accept, admit and call for such evidence as in equity and good conscience it 
thinks fit, whether strictly legal evidence or not". Therefore: 
Evidence called to corroborate allegations of sexual har.assment and evidence 
called with a view to establishing what are called ' 'similar facts'' is clearly 
admissible at law if the Court in equity and good conscience sees fit to admit 
it, and if admitted may be challenged in this Court only as to its probative 
value. 
(AB Ltd case, supr~ p.7) 
This also prompts some considerations of the relationship between the sexual 
harassment .Provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987 and the criminal law. Some 
types of sexual harassment are criminal offences, and the complainant always has the 
option of reporting the matter to the police. The point I wish to emphasise is that even if 
a criminal prosecution fails., a complaint of sexual harassment may still be made out on 
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the same facts, because of the differing standards of proof and the diffelient approaches to 
the .admissibility of certain kinds of evidence. 
Conclusions 
It is far too early to mak·e any generalisations about the success or failure of these 
provisions. There has not been any sudden explosion of sexual harassment cases since the 
enactment of the 1987 Act, at least if Labour Court decisions are anything to go by. It is 
possible that more cases are being dealt with at the grievance committee stage, but it is, 
of course, equally possible that they are not, and there is no easy way to find out. My 
su~icion is that the 1987 Act has had little impact on the problem of sexual harassment, 
but this is an entirely subjective view. Personal grievanc.e procedures are still largely the 
province of a worker's union, and the effectiveness of the Act is cenainly dependent upon 
the willingness of unions to tak~e complaints of sexual harassment seriously, and on a 
worker's willingness to bring the matter to the attention of her union in the first place. 
